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Ma¯ori Intellectual Property Rights and
the Formation of Ethnic Boundaries
Toon van Meijl*
Abstract: This article questions and contextualizes the emergence of a
discourse of intellectual property rights in Ma¯ori society. It is argued that
Ma¯ori claims regarding intellectual property function primarily to demarcate
ethnic boundaries between Ma¯ori and non-Ma¯ori. Ma¯ori consider the
reinforcement of ethnic boundaries necessary since they experience their
society and distinctive way of life as endangered both by the foreign
consumption or misappropriation of aspects of their authentic cultural forms
and by the intrusion of foreign cultural elements. Following Simon Harrison
(1999) it is argued that the first threat is often represented as an undesired
form of cultural appropriation, piracy or theft, while the second threat is
viewed as a form of cultural pollution. This argument is elaborated with a
case-study of each so-called danger, namely a claim regarding native flora and
fauna submitted to the Waitangi Tribunal, which is considered as an example
of resistance against cultural appropriation, and the increasing hostility of
Ma¯ori to foreign interest and research in Ma¯ori culture and society, which is
analysed as an example of opposition to putative pollution.
Over the past decade, the cultural renaissance of the New Zealand Ma¯ori has ex-
panded into the legal regime of intellectual property rights. Ma¯ori people have
not simply become more conscious and more proud of their cultural heritage, but
their cultural traditions and the knowledge associated with them are increasingly
cast as property of which the indigenous people of Aotearoa are the intellectual
owners. Worldwide the discourse of intellectual property rights rapidly prolifer-
ated among indigenous peoples in the course of the 1990s. As early as 1991 this
resulted a New Zealand Ma¯ori claim to the Waitangi Tribunal regarding indig-
enous forests and seven species of flora and fauna that are unique to New Zea-
land, namely the ku¯mara (sweet potato), po¯hutukawa (New Zealand Christmas
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tree), koromiko (shrubs), puawa¯nanga (native climbing plant), pu¯pu¯ harakeke (flax
snail), tuatara (reptile like a large lizard), and the kereru¯ (wood pigeon). It was not
until the late 1990s, however, that the concept of intellectual property rights began
to more broadly refer to the protection of Ma¯ori heritage at large. In this article I
argue that these more recent Ma¯ori discourses of cultural and intellectual prop-
erty may be considered a sign of protest against the neglect of indigenous knowl-
edge and associated traditions in the colonial past, while they also evoke a political
struggle for indigenous autonomy. A function of the new, broader meaning of
intellectual property rights is therefore the demarcation of ethnic boundaries be-
tween Ma¯ori and non-Ma¯ori.
The first intellectual property claim that received abundant attention in the media
was the objection of Ma¯ori to the Danish company of LEGO toys when in 2001 it
released on the market its Bionicle game in which Ma¯ori words, names, and con-
cepts are used. Several Ma¯ori groups appeared unhappy with this use—in their
view, abuse—of traditional names and concepts, and forced LEGO to stop using
Ma¯ori words for its hi-tech toys.1 Ma¯ori challenges to LEGO’s use of Ma¯ori words
and names have subsequently inspired many Ma¯ori groups and individuals to speak
out against the use of Ma¯ori concepts in non-Ma¯ori domains or, alternatively, when
they are deployed for purposes that deviate from their original meaning. Thus, a
restaurateur in Amsterdam was persuaded to change the name of his new prem-
ise, which he had brandedMoko, referring to Ma¯ori tattoo designs. Similarly, Ma¯ori
express their strong disapproval when non-Ma¯ori people, including celebrities such
as the singer Robbie Williams and the former world heavyweight champion in
boxing Mike Tyson, wear a Ma¯ori tattoo and indicate they have no knowledge of,
let alone sympathy with, the indigenous population of New Zealand. Likewise, the
performance of the haka, a posture dance that has become famous around the
world because it is carried out by the All Blacks (the national rugby team) before
every test match, is condemned when staged by, for example, the Spice Girls dur-
ing a holiday on Bali or by 100 scantily clad girls for a British television beer com-
mercial. Indeed, nowadays Ma¯ori voices of protest are raised immediately when
cultural symbols and expressions such as Ma¯ori moko and the haka are used for
decoration or entertainment. Losing their original cultural meaning and signifi-
cance in the new context is deplored and therefore discouraged.When non-Ma¯ori
are urged to refrain from using anything of Ma¯ori origin, this appeal is increas-
ingly justified with reference to the intellectual ownership of the names, concepts,
designs, symbols, or expressions. Ma¯ori draw on the legal discourse of intellectual
property, with the hope and expectation that it will enable them either to prohibit
other people from using Ma¯ori symbols or to stipulate conditions severely restrict-
ing the use or exploitation of Ma¯ori cultural symbols.
This article aims to interpret, question, and contextualize Ma¯ori appeals to the
concept of intellectual property rights. Over the past decade, it has become obvious
that intellectual property rights, normally recognized for patents, copyrights, and
trademarks only, cannot automatically be used for the protection of indigenous
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knowledge for a variety of reasons.Ma¯ori consider their cultural knowledge as their
property because it is understood to have been transmitted over generations of Ma¯ori
people; but legally, this transmission is precisely what makes it rather problematic:
It implies that the indigenous heritage ismuch older than is allowedwithin the scope
of intellectual property legislation (50 or 70 years). Indigenous expressions of knowl-
edge cannot be ascribed to one identifiable inventor either, which is another re-
quirement of conventional intellectual property legislation.2 In addition, indigenous
claims to stop others from using their heritage are also contradictory to the pur-
pose of intellectual property legislation that aims at making knowledge available in
the public domain.3 These contradictions are further compounded by the expan-
sion of the concept of intellectual property to cultural property as though the law
would recognize originality in a broad sense, which it does not.4
Legal barriers to using intellectual property rights, however, do not stop Ma¯ori
people from seeking support of this regime for the protection of their cultural
heritage (i.e., by developing sui generis legislation).5 Continuing appeals to the
legal regime of intellectual property rights, however, do raise the question regard-
ing the function of the legal discourse in relation to Ma¯ori culture. The argument
put forward here is that the notion of intellectual property rights is appealing less
for reasons of material gain than because it supports Ma¯ori attempts to mark out
boundaries around their social, cultural, and symbolic practices to regain their
indigenous autonomy and differentiate themselves from mainstream New Zea-
land society. In my view Ma¯ori consider the specific and explicit delineation of
cultural and ethnic boundaries necessary because they experience their society and
distinctive way of life as endangered both by the intrusion of foreign cultural ele-
ments and the foreign consumption or misappropriation of aspects of their au-
thentic cultural forms. Following Harrison, it may be argued that the first threat is
often represented as an undesired form of cultural pollution, whereas the second
threat is viewed as a form of cultural appropriation, piracy, or theft.6 Both imag-
eries are related in Ma¯ori discourse because a common rhetoric of intellectual prop-
erty rights is employed to counter the perceived threats.7 In this article I elaborate
this argument with a case-study of each so-called danger, namely the claim re-
garding native flora and fauna submitted to the Waitangi Tribunal, which I con-
sider an example of resistance against cultural appropriation, and the increasing
hostility of Ma¯ori to foreign interest and research in Ma¯ori culture and society,
which I analyze as an example of opposition to so-called pollution.
WAI 2628
In 1988 a group of Ma¯ori elders gathered to discuss their common concern over
the increasing depletion of native plants and animals, the ongoing destruction of
ecosystems, and the gradual loss of traditional Ma¯ori knowledge (ma¯tauranga
Ma¯ori ) associated with indigenous flora and fauna. They formulated a claim to
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the Waitangi Tribunal9 that was filed in 1991 and amended in 1997, but submis-
sions were not completed until the year 2006; it has become known as claim Wai
262. The claim was submitted by six tribes from various regions in New Zealand:
Nga¯ti Kuri, Nga¯ti Wai, Te Rarawa, Nga¯ti Kahungunu, Nga¯ti Porou, and Nga¯ti Koata.
The main aim of the claim is to protect Ma¯ori cultural and intellectual heritage
rights in relation to indigenous flora and fauna and their traditional knowledge,
customs, and practices related to it.
The claim is founded on the rights mentioned in article 2 of the Treaty of Wait-
angi, which guaranteed to Ma¯ori “the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of
their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may col-
lectively or individually possess.” The crucial phrase in the Ma¯ori version of this
clause is centered around Ma¯ori chieftainship, or te tino rangatiratanga, on the
basis of which Ma¯ori people claim the right to self-determination. In the State-
ment of Claim Wai 262, it is also declared that Ma¯ori people “have been and are
prejudicially affected by the actions and omissions of the Crown and its represen-
tatives in denying te tino rangatiratanga.” Chieftainship in this context is further
specified as the right to determine, participate in, benefit from, and make deci-
sions about “the protection, control, conservation, management, treatment, prop-
agation, sale, dispersal, utilisation and restrictions upon the use of indigenous flora
and fauna . . . the genetic resources therein me o ratou taonga katoa (and all their
treasures). . . .” The concept of taonga in the Ma¯ori language, and therefore also in
this claim, refers to both material and nonmaterial, tangible and intangible, di-
mensions of a tribal group’s estate. Hence, it is mentioned in the Statement of
Claim that taonga include, but are not limited to knowledge, carvings, sacred sites,
Ma¯ori medicines, biodiversity, genetics, Ma¯ori cultural images, symbols and de-
signs, their use and development, and also their associated indigenous, cultural
and customary heritage rights.
The Statement of Claim contends that the rights that Ma¯ori people derive from
the Treaty of Waitangi and that relate to their cultural heritage have been violated
since Ma¯ori have never been involved in decision-making processes about tech-
nological developments, such as conventional plant breeding and genetic engi-
neering. These techniques are increasingly applied to several native plant species
in intergovernmental research programs. However, Ma¯ori people have never been
consulted about Crown policies such as patenting and protection. Consequently,
they claim that their proprietary interests in native flora and fauna have been ne-
glected in the past and continue to be neglected in the present. Protection policies
and the disposal of patents to multinational companies without Ma¯ori consent
have placed indigenous flora and fauna beyond Ma¯ori access and fail to acknowl-
edge the cultural role of the Ma¯ori people as guardians of New Zealand’s native
species. International scientific organizations and overseas commercial companies
can collect native species through Crown export trade policies, but it is argued in
the Statement of Claim that the result simply is that Ma¯ori suffer the loss of access
to indigenous plants and animals for traditional purposes.
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These general grievances of the claimants are clarified in the Statement of Claim
through a discussion of several particular species of flora and fauna, especially in re-
lation to specific Crown actions and inactions affecting the species.10 As mentioned
before, claimants focus their concerns on various species of indigenous forest tim-
ber, four species of flora, and three species of fauna. All species are regarded as an
integral part of Te Wao Nui a Tane (The Great Forest of Tane), which refers to the
natural habitat of the species that are subject of the claim. In addition, the native spe-
cies are considered gifts from Papatuanuku (the Earth-Mother). As such, they fall
underMa¯ori guardianship, but because this is culturally expected to be exercised by
different Ma¯ori tribes, the claim has been submitted by six different tribal groups.
THE (MIS-)APPROPRIATION OF MA¯ORI CULTURAL HERITAGE
In view of the magnitude and scope of claim Wai 262, it is taking the Waitangi
Tribunal a long time to complete investigations. In 1997 some hearings took place,
but the completion of traditional evidence of the six tribes was subsequently post-
poned until 2006. In the meantime several research reports have also been com-
missioned by the tribunal, but the final report is still pending. A comparative
analysis of the research reports illustrates that the legal discourse of intellectual
property rights serves to depoliticize the underlying sociopolitical debate about
the unequal relationship between Ma¯ori and the dominant European majority in
New Zealand. A political struggle about power and control clearly influences the
juridical discussion about the property rights of Ma¯ori culture between lawyers.
Thus, David Williams offers strong support of the Ma¯ori claim by expanding the
evidence offered by the claimants in their Statement of Claim.11 At the same time,
he criticizes the strictly legal perspective on the claim offered by Peter Dengate
Thrush,12 who has assessedWai 262 in light of international legislation in the field
of intellectual property rights, and who concluded skeptically that “modern intel-
lectual property doctrines may be of little relevance” to the claim.13 Although the
findings of Dengate Thrush have been criticized on political grounds, his legal
discussion provides a broad perspective on the significance of intellectual prop-
erty legislation for Wai 262.
Dengate Thrush14 doubts whether the species to which the claim refers may be
patented for two different reasons. First, he argues that current intellectual prop-
erty thinking considers those species as all plants and animals to be in the public
domain. Second, and more importantly, he draws attention to the fact that patents
are only awarded when common goods are transformed into a new product. In
such cases patents refer either to the new product or to the new method of trans-
formation. Thus, the species mentioned in the claim cannot be patented, only new
species or new methods of using or processing the species.
Obviously, claimWai 262 is directed toward granting intellectual property rights
in relation to the species of indigenous flora and fauna, but to a large extent it
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may be read as an objection to the absence of control of the processes affecting
the plants and animals. Here, too, however, Dengate Thrush15 plays the devil’s
advocate. He explicitly rejects the allegation, for example, that the Crown delib-
erately allowed numerous species of kumara to be sent overseas, by referring to
the common sense knowledge that for hundreds of years plants and animals world-
wide were regarded as common property. This is embedded in the International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources passed by the United Nations Food and
Agricultural Organisation in 1983.16
In conclusion, Dengate Thrush advances the view that “intellectual property
law is an inappropriate vehicle for the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights.”17
He draws attention to the ambivalence of the claim, referring to intellectual prop-
erty rights as well as proprietary rights grounded in the Treaty of Waitangi, re-
sulting in the request for total control. Skepticism about the first aspect of the
claim is based on the lack of evidence that new species may be developed or that
species may be used in an innovative manner, whereas the second aspect is doubt-
ful because it remains unclear whether each species mentioned in the claim was
under proprietary control at the time when the treaty was signed in 1840. It is
important to emphasize that Dengate Thrush does not deny Ma¯ori rights to their
legal property as protected by the Treaty of Waitangi. Dengate Thrush has only
expressed his reservations about the evidence provided in the claim and the rele-
vance of the intellectual property law paradigm to the desire of the Ma¯ori to re-
gain control about everything that they consider “their own.”18
Indeed, a close analysis of Wai 262 leaves the impression that Ma¯ori people ap-
peal to intellectual property rights, not primarily to secure the exclusive rights to
a limited number of biological resources, but mainly to prevent their commercial-
ization by non-Ma¯ori and also to stop the (mis-)appropriation of their heritage
by others. Thus, intellectual property rights seem to be used partly as a vehicle to
sharpen the boundaries between Ma¯ori and non-Ma¯ori, which cannot be under-
stood independently of the Ma¯ori quest for sovereignty. Against the background
of dispossession and disenfranchisement in the colonial era, Ma¯ori people con-
sider it increasingly important to define mine and thine, and for that purpose each
available strategy is applied, including the legal regime of intellectual property leg-
islation. In view of the growing relevance of intellectual property rights in the
international arena of indigenous peoples, Ma¯ori people have also begun explor-
ing this domain to recover their lost ground, both literally and symbolically. The
metaphorical meaning of the intellectual property of the plants and animals that
form the subject of claim Wai 262 is the unequivocal political message that Ma¯ori
people no longer accept that aspects of their cultural heritage be used by others
for purposes that may be irreconcilable with Ma¯ori intentions.
The ramification of this strategy becomes particularly evident in comparison
with the parallel tendency of setting hurdles for the access of outsiders to Ma¯ori
society for research purposes. The admission of nonindigenous people for reasons
of study is increasingly complicated because they are under suspicion of possibly
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alienating essential elements of Ma¯ori society that Ma¯ori people consider as their
own. In addition, foreign interest is believed to endanger the integrity and propri-
ety of Ma¯ori culture, which is progressively protected as the intellectual property
of the indigenous people of New Zealand. The Ma¯ori lawyer Aroha Mead,19 for
example, discusses the creation of Ma¯ori Centres for Research Excellence at New
Zealand universities as an important attempt to reclaim Ma¯ori research, which
she justifies with reference to intellectual property legislation. Thus, the obstruc-
tion of external interest in indigenous culture is not only justified as the necessary
preservation of cultural purity, but it is also linked to the campaign against the
possible loss of cultural aspects from Ma¯ori society, which is legitimized as the
protection of their cultural and intellectual ownership.20
The paradoxical relationship between the two ostensibly different political strat-
egies of checking and balancing—on the one hand, the foreign consumption and,
on the other hand, the foreign intrusion of Ma¯ori cultural elements and forms—is
that both are increasingly justified with reference to the protection of Ma¯ori in-
tellectual property rights. An important implication of the discourse about intel-
lectual property rights is therefore that cultural boundaries are reinforced between
insiders and outsiders, between authentic and inauthentic. In the next section I
further elaborate that following the growing resistance from Ma¯ori to research
into their society, the exchange of cultural symbols across ethnic boundaries is
hampered.
OPEN VERSUS CLOSED RESEARCH
Over the past 40 years, it has become increasingly difficult for non-Ma¯ori to con-
duct research into Ma¯ori society. In view of the colonial legacy of New Zealand it
cannot be surprising that many Ma¯ori people are reluctant to accept views of their
society that are authored by outsiders, but it is unprecedented that Ma¯ori repre-
sent research into their society by non-Ma¯ori more and more as an infringement
of their intellectual property.21 For that reason, too, it is advocated widely that
research into things Ma¯ori must only be conducted by Ma¯ori. In this context it is
interesting to discuss recent attempts to substantiate Ma¯ori resistance against eth-
nographic and historical research into their society by outsiders.22
Decolonizing Methodologies (1999) by Linda Tuhiwai Smith is the most contro-
versial book invalidating research by outsiders interested in indigenous peoples’
societies. In this book Smith argues that acquiring knowledge about indigenous
peoples, as distinct from what they narrate about themselves, is a way of coloniz-
ing them and amounts therefore to imperialism. Her argument is partly derived
from the view of Foucault and Said that knowledge and representation may be
used as an instrument of power. Smith’s interpretation of this point, however, is
that the only valid knowledge about colonized societies, such as those of indig-
enous peoples, is the knowledge that indigenous peoples produce about them-
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selves, because knowledge of indigenous peoples developed by outsiders may only
serve the purpose of oppression. Indigenous peoples are therefore to be given the
monopoly over and total control of their representation. Thus, Smith advocates
the rigorous replacement of the so-called colonizing methodology of research by
a decolonized methodology that only allows indigenous peoples to speak for
themselves.
The final chapter of the book provides suggestions for the implementation of
decolonized research. The main recommendation is to check and consult with peo-
ple to understand their thoughts and behavior in their own environment.23 This
conclusion is so obvious that it also reveals that the crux of the book revolves
around the ethnicity of the researcher. Underlying the distinction between colo-
nized and decolonized research is a dichotomy between outsiders and—
indigenous—insiders. This division involves a caricature of non-Ma¯ori researchers
as well as a naïve idealization of Ma¯ori academics and their work. Furthermore, it
excludes Ma¯ori scholars from being internally critical while it also pressurizes them
not to write about non-Ma¯ori. Consequently, Smith’s proposition that indigenous
discourses of Ma¯ori society are to be privileged above research from outsidersmust
be deconstructed, especially because most cases refer to a small group of advan-
taged academics, which pretends to be representative because they have a vested
interest in the arguments that are at stake in a contested field of representation.24
In this context it is important to make explicit that Ma¯ori society is a hierar-
chical society in which certain groups are traditionally advantaged above others.
The tribal division of status and prestige continues to linger on in contemporary
society, reflected among other things in higher education, better jobs, and higher
incomes for a small group of people that is not infrequently of aristocratic de-
scent.25 In view of the segregation of Ma¯ori society, it is essential to leave the
whole discursive field of analysis open to interventions from every direction; and
therefore, too, non-Ma¯ori scholars cannot be expected to write exclusively for
their informants. In this context it is crucial to ask, “Which informants?” To which
sociopolitical rank do they belong? In view of these questions, no voices should
be silenced in this multisided debate, inside or outside. Contributions to the rep-
resentation of Ma¯ori society should be judged primarily on their analytical mer-
its rather than their origins.
Recently, several other attempts have been made to demonstrate that Ma¯ori
knowledge is fundamentally different from European knowledge. Roberts and
Wills,26 for example, have argued that the distinctive template for Ma¯ori knowl-
edge is constituted by genealogies (whakapapa), which provide “the cognitive frame-
work for ordering and classifying the entire phenomenal world, and also for
developing theories about knowledge.”27 The connection between genealogy and
knowledge also illustrates the link between Ma¯ori conceptions of knowledge and
claims of Ma¯ori cultural and intellectual ownership. This link is further com-
pounded by the view that whakapapa guide the disclosure of knowledge to those
not yet familiar with it. In that context, a distinction is made between “open knowl-
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edge” accessible to all and “closed knowledge” restricted to “a chosen few.”28 This
hierarchy of knowledge makes knowledge vulnerable to the active repression of
dissonant expressions and unorthodox ideas that may be associated with differ-
ences in power and influence. This flip side of the distinction between open and
closed knowledge within Ma¯ori society makes it interesting to draw an analogy
with the distinction between colonizing and decolonizing methodologies made by
Linda Smith.29
The notion of whakapapa has also come to play a crucial role in the increas-
ingly politicized discussion about research into Ma¯ori history. In 1991 the Ma¯ori
historian Joseph Pere set the tone for the debate with a so-called Ma¯ori perspec-
tive on the practice of Ma¯ori history writing and the related question of who could
do so. He challenged the right of non-Ma¯ori historians to engage in Ma¯ori histo-
riography, because in his view they lack the genealogical connections necessary to
understand the most important values, beliefs, and attitudes that are central in
Ma¯ori society in past and present. To avoid the risk of joining the ranks of the
“historical imperialists” of the nineteenth century, he stipulated the condition of
approval by Ma¯ori elders, the guardians of the ancestors, for all research into the
sacred past of the Ma¯ori.30 This view also implies a full and final closure of re-
search into the past and the present of Ma¯ori society.31
Another crucial contribution to the debate on the differences between internal
and external perspectives on the Ma¯ori past and present has recently been made
by the Ma¯ori scholar Te Maire Tau.32 He also outlines a vision of traditional Ma¯ori
knowledge (ma¯tauranga Ma¯ori ) as a separate way of knowing in contrast with the
western worldview. In his view, too, ma¯tauranga Ma¯ori is incapable of compre-
hension or criticism by the western canons of epistemology and methodology,
because it is authorized and sanctioned by the ancestors. This assumption does
not only permit the possibility that ma¯tauranga Ma¯ori is taken as the sole measure
of the Ma¯ori past and the Ma¯ori present, but at the same time it allows for Ma¯ori
claims of cultural and intellectual ownership of knowledge.
Both Pere’s and Tau’s reflections on the differences between Ma¯ori and Euro-
pean knowledge systems and the implications for Ma¯ori historiography have al-
ready led to interesting reflections by New Zealand historians. Ballara33 has analyzed
this debate in terms of the classic dilemma between “emic” and “etic” perspectives
in cross-cultural research. Reilly made the insightful remark that the Ma¯ori his-
torians discussed above are not simply indigenizing Ma¯ori history writings, but
“they are asserting a claim of tino rangatiratanga or sovereignty over history about
the Ma¯ori of Aotearoa.”34 This statement highlights the connection between these
radical attempts to keep ethnography and historiography about Ma¯ori for Ma¯ori,
on one hand, and Ma¯ori claims of cultural and intellectual ownership of knowl-
edge, on the other. It draws attention to the underlying motivation behind the
tendency to close Ma¯ori research for non-Ma¯ori, which effectively functions to
create and reinforce ethnic boundaries between Ma¯ori and European scholars. This
highlights the essential meaning of the recent emergence of the discourse of cul-
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tural and intellectual property rights in Ma¯ori society that not only parallels the
closure of Ma¯ori research for non-Ma¯ori, but in terms of which it is also justified
and legitimized.
ETHICAL IMPURITY?
The role of ethnography and historiography in the colonization of non-western
peoples has been the subject of scholarly reflection for a long time.35 It is no lon-
ger disputed that both academic disciplines made important contributions to the
colonial project of classifying, representing, and ruling subject populations. This
unequivocal conclusion, however, does not imply that the encounter between for-
eign researchers and colonized populations can be reduced to a relationship be-
tween oppressor and oppressed. Many historians and ethnographers have been
involved in a serious challenge of the assumption of colonial superiority. The in-
teraction between both sides of the colonial encounter was therefore more com-
plex, and not all documentations of indigenous worldviews can be rejected as
contaminated by colonialism.36 In addition, it is ironic that today many indig-
enous peoples, including Ma¯ori, make good use of historical and ethnographic
records drawn up by foreign researchers to substantiate, for example, claims about
violations of the Treaty of Waitangi. Despite this ambivalent relationship of Ma¯ori
to research into their society by non-Ma¯ori, the tendency toward external atten-
tion or curiosity is one of increasing hostility.
A variety of strategies is deployed to regulate research by outsiders to avoid the
misappropriation of aspects of indigenous societies. The most important mecha-
nism in this context is the organization of procedures to ensure that academic
research meets certain ethical guidelines. All research that takes place under the
auspices of a New Zealand university or in which academics affiliated to a local
university are involved now must be approved of by ethical committees in which
Ma¯ori are strongly represented. Just recently, the University of Otago even decided
to consult the local Ngai Tahu tribe concerning, not only research involving Ma¯ori,
but all research undertaken by employees of the university and its affiliates.37 The
ethics of academic research are generally characterized by ambiguities and dilem-
mas, however, which makes ethical procedures and the implementation of ethical
codes vulnerable to ethnic politics.38 Some of my students, for example, who aimed
to become advocates of indigenous politics, met with great opposition fromMa¯ori
delegates on ethical committees at New Zealand universities, who simply applied
bureaucratic procedures to discourage them to proceed with their pilot projects.
Thus, intellectual property claims are extended to all types of research, including
noncommercial studies.
Following Greaves39 and Strathern,40 I wish to avoid all possible misunderstand-
ings about any implications of my argument suggesting that intellectual property
legislation may not constitute an appropriate vehicle for the reorganization of eth-
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nographic and historical research into Ma¯ori society by non-Ma¯ori. Inevitably,
Ma¯ori will redirect research into their society and prevent the commercialization
of aspects of their culture by outsiders. At the same time, however, it might be
subject of debate whether references to intellectual property rights regarding the
results of ethnographic and historical research are the most productive in this con-
text because they entail the reinforcement of ethnic boundaries between Ma¯ori
and non-Ma¯ori.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have analyzed Ma¯ori discourses of intellectual property rights as
political strategies to demarcate ethnic boundaries between Ma¯ori and non-Ma¯ori.
This argument has enabled me to discuss two discourses under the same rubric,
namely Ma¯ori attempts to prevent the (mis-)appropriation of aspects of their cul-
tural heritage by outsiders, on one hand, and Ma¯ori attempts to prevent research
into their society by outsiders, on the other hand. Both strategies result in the
reinforcement of ethnic boundaries, but there is a crucial difference between them:
The first boundary is drawn because Ma¯ori culture is assumed to be threatened by
the foreign appropriation and exploitation of indigenous cultural forms, whereas
the second is put up to avoid interventions in Ma¯ori culture through the intrusion
of foreign researchers.41
The first practice I have illustrated with a case-study of Wai 262, a claim sub-
mitted to the Waitangi Tribunal regarding the protection of indigenous flora and
fauna. Ma¯ori claim to be the cultural owners of the biological species mentioned
in the claim as well as the intellectual owners of all knowledge associated with
the species concerned and that may be used for the development of, for exam-
ple, new medicines. Interestingly, however, the evidence regarding the possible
exploitation of indigenous flora and fauna is rather limited so that other motives
behind the claim must be assumed. These I have deconstructed as political and
strategic to secure Ma¯ori culture at large against the use by non-Ma¯ori. This also
explains the increasing references to Ma¯ori intellectual property rights in New
Zealand as mentioned and discussed in the beginning of this article. Ma¯ori peo-
ple are sick and tired of the use of their culture or aspects thereof by others who
in some situations make some money with the commercialization of Ma¯ori cul-
tural forms.42 In consequence, they now seek to secure legal rights to their cul-
tural and intellectual property, but the result is that the meaning of this juridical
regime has been stretched beyond its limits. In practice, the discourse of intel-
lectual property rights when applied to prevent the misappropriation of Ma¯ori
cultural aspects functions chiefly to reinforce ethnic boundaries between Ma¯ori
and non-Ma¯ori by employing a rhetoric of cultural appropriation, piracy, or theft43
and ending as far as possible the external movement of virtually anything orig-
inating in Ma¯ori society. In a letter to the editor of a national newspaper, some-
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one even expressed her opposition to non-Ma¯ori “appropriating” the Ma¯ori
language, which was likened to the land thefts in the nineteenth century (The
Dominion Post, 6-3-2003). It illustrates what some Ma¯ori appeals to intellectual
property rights may entail, at least in ideology: the end of all cross-cultural ex-
changes and ultimately even of all communication.
I have illustrated the second practice with an analysis of Ma¯ori attempts to close
their society to outside researchers. Naturally, this discussion extends from the first
discourse that seeks to stop the flow of cultural elements out of Ma¯ori society.
This makes it simultaneously necessary to stop the interference of foreign research-
ers, who after all are offered the opportunity to extract cultural elements from
Ma¯ori society when allowed to cross the boundaries and conduct their research.
The barriers constructed to research by outsiders in Ma¯ori society are legitimized
in terms of a discourse about the protection of Ma¯ori knowledge systems that
become desacralized if not polluted by foreign research because non-Ma¯ori have
no genealogical connections with Ma¯ori.
The common denominator of both practices is the division of the world into
two radically distinct kinds of people: Ma¯ori and non-Ma¯ori, insiders and outsid-
ers.44 This distinction, however, is drawn in two different ways. In the first dis-
course insiders are represented as those with a Ma¯ori whakapapa and therefore
entitled to the use, reproduction, and exploitation of Ma¯ori traditions, customs,
and beliefs, while outsiders are excluded from these rights. In the second dis-
course, insiders also have genealogical connections with Ma¯ori ancestors; and for
that reason they may be considered as blessed with a commitment to uphold Ma¯ori
traditions, customs, doctrines, and beliefs, while outsiders lack the guidance of the
ancestral guardians and therefore must be considered as desecrating, impure, and
inferior. In both cases Ma¯ori self-definition is accomplished in opposition to a
potentially or actually threatening Other, which, however, is again constructed in
two opposite ways, either as an extractive or exploitative Other for whom Ma¯ori
culture has to be secluded, or as an expansionist or intervening Other whose in-
trusion has to be resisted. In sum, Ma¯ori people deploy a rhetoric of cultural and
intellectual property rights to enclose themselves in boundaries against both the
external piracy and the internal pollution of their culture.
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